Will Hunt is a Research Analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) focusing on semiconductor workforce and supply chain issues. Previously, he was a policy researcher at the University of Oxford and at the AI Security Initiative at the Center for Long Term Cybersecurity. He has co-authored commentary on semiconductor policy in The Wall Street Journal. Will is completing his PhD in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where his research focuses on U.S.-China technology competition. He attended Deep Springs College and holds a BA in Political Science from Yale University.
Since 1990, the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity has declined while the shares of China, South Korea, and Taiwan have increased. If carefully targeted, CHIPS for America Act incentives could reverse this trend for the types of chips that matter most to U.S. national security. In this policy brief, the author assesses how CHIPS Act incentives should be distributed across different types of chips.
Superconductor Electronics ResearchNovember 2021
Devices based on superconductor electronics can achieve much higher energy efficiency than standard electronics. Research in superconductor electronics could advance a range of commercial and defense priorities, with potential applications for supercomputing, artificial intelligence, sensors, signal processing, and quantum computing. This brief identifies the countries most actively contributing to superconductor electronics research and assesses their relative competitiveness in terms of both research output and funding.
Will Hunt’s Testimony Before the Strategic Technologies and Advanced Research (STAR) SubcommitteeJuly 2021
CSET Research Analyst Will Hunt testified before the Strategic Technologies and Advanced Research (STAR) Subcommittee on "Microelectronics: Levers for Promoting Security and Innovation." He offered recommendations to advance the U.S.' semiconductor industry.
CSET submitted this comment to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security on how to address concerns about the security of semiconductor supply chains in regions where natural disasters, geopolitical events or other factors might cause serious disruptions.
To reduce its dependence on the United States and its allies for semiconductors, China is building domestic semiconductor manufacturing facilities by importing U.S., Japanese, and Dutch semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In the longer term, it also hopes to indigenize this equipment to replace imports. U.S. and allied policy responses to China’s efforts will significantly affect its prospects for success in this challenging task.
The Chipmakers: U.S. Strengths and Priorities for the High-End Semiconductor WorkforceSeptember 2020
Technical leadership in the semiconductor industry has been a cornerstone of U.S. military and economic power for decades, but continued competitiveness is not guaranteed. This issue brief exploring the composition of the workforce bolstering U.S. leadership in the semiconductor industry concludes that immigration restrictions are directly at odds with U.S. efforts to secure its supply chains.
American chip companies depend on foreign graduates and workers, write Remco Zwetsloot and Will Hunt. New large-scale immigration restrictions, if successful, will hamstring efforts to bring home advanced semiconductor manufacturing.