U.S. policymakers are increasingly concerned about the national security implications of U.S. investments in China, and some are considering a new regime for reviewing outbound investment security. The authors identify the main U.S. investors active in the Chinese artificial intelligence market and the set of AI companies in China that have benefitted from U.S. capital. They also recommend next steps for U.S. policymakers to better address the concerns over capital flowing into the Chinese AI ecosystem.

CSET's Dr. Caroline Schuerger, Dr. Steph Batalis, and Vikram Venkatram submitted this comment with recommendations for the National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative.

The U.S. semiconductor supply chain’s resilience will meaningfully increase only if current efforts to re-shore fabrication (that is, to situate more facilities that make its key parts in the United States) are met with commensurate efforts to re-shore upstream material production along with downstream assembly, test, and packaging (ATP) of finished microelectronics.

Machine learning advances have powered the development of new and more powerful generative language models. These systems are increasingly able to write text at near human levels. In a new report, authors at CSET, OpenAI, and the Stanford Internet Observatory explore how language models could be misused for influence operations in the future, and provide a framework for assessing potential mitigation strategies.

U.S. policies on artificial intelligence education and the AI workforce must grow, cultivate, attract, and retain the world’s best and brightest. Given China’s role as a producer of AI talent, understanding its AI workforce could provide important insight. This report provides an analysis of the AI workforce demand in China using a novel dataset of 6.8 million job postings. It then outlines potential implications along with future reports in this series.

CSET's Ali Crawford and Jessica Ji submitted this comment to the Office of the National Cyber Director in response to a request for information on a national strategy for a cyber workforce, training, and education.

U.S. federal policymakers have recently gained the authority to block government agencies and private organizations from using foreign technologies that pose national security risks. But securing U.S. networks will require them to wield those powers effectively and better coordinate supply chain security efforts across all levels of government. The authors provide an overview of federal- and state-level procurement bans and recommend ways to build stronger defense against foreign technology threats.

Policymakers, engineers, program managers and operators need the bedrock of a common set of terms to instantiate responsible AI for the Department of Defense. Rather than create a DOD-specific set of terms, this paper argues that the DOD could benefit by adopting the key characteristics defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in its draft AI Risk Management Framework with only two exceptions.

CSET submitted the following comment in response to the National Institute for Standards and Technology's second draft of its AI Risk Management Framework.

China is rapidly building cyber ranges that allow cybersecurity teams to test new tools, practice attack and defense, and evaluate the cybersecurity of a particular product or service. The presence of these facilities suggests a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese government, in partnership with industry and academia, to advance technological research and upskill its cybersecurity workforce—more evidence that China has entered near-peer status with the United States in the cyber domain.