CSET submitted the following comment in response to the National Institute for Standards and Technology's second draft of its AI Risk Management Framework.

China is rapidly building cyber ranges that allow cybersecurity teams to test new tools, practice attack and defense, and evaluate the cybersecurity of a particular product or service. The presence of these facilities suggests a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese government, in partnership with industry and academia, to advance technological research and upskill its cybersecurity workforce—more evidence that China has entered near-peer status with the United States in the cyber domain.

Biosafety Level-3 laboratories (BSL-3) are an essential part of research infrastructure and are used to develop vaccines and therapies. The research conducted in them provides insights into host-pathogen interactions that may help prevent future pandemics. However, these facilities also potentially pose a risk to society through lab accidents or misuse. Despite their importance, there is no comprehensive list of BSL-3 facilities, or the institutions in which they are housed. By systematically assessing PubMed articles published in English from 2006-2021, this paper maps institutions that host BSL-3 labs by their locations, augmenting current knowledge of where high-containment research is conducted globally.

Funding and priorities for technology development today determine the terrain for digital battles tomorrow, and they provide the arsenals for both attackers and defenders. Unfortunately, researchers and strategists disagree on which technologies will ultimately be most beneficial and which cause more harm than good. This report provides three examples showing that, while the future of technology is impossible to predict with certainty, there is enough empirical data and mathematical theory to have these debates with more rigor.

In the current cyber-threat environment, a well-educated workforce is critical to U.S. national security. Today, however, nearly six hundred thousand cybersecurity positions remain unfilled across the public and private sectors. This report explores high school cybersecurity competitions as a potential avenue for increasing the domestic cyber talent pipeline. The authors examine the competitions, their reach, and their impact on students’ educational and professional development.

Geopolitical tensions between the United States and China have sparked an ongoing dialogue in Washington about the phenomenon of “decoupling”—the use of public policy tools to separate the multifaceted economic ties that connect the two powers. This issue brief provides a historical lens on the efficacy of one specific aspect of this broader decoupling phenomenon: using export controls and related trade policies to prevent a rival from acquiring the equipment and know-how to catch up to the United States in cutting-edge, strategically important technologies.

Tracking the output of a country’s researchers can inform assessments of its innovativeness or assist in evaluating the impact of certain funding initiatives. However, measuring research output is not as straightforward as it may seem. Using a detailed analysis that includes Chinese-language research publications, this data brief reveals that China's lead in artificial intelligence research output is greater than many English-language sources suggest.

China is following a national strategy to lead the world in artificial intelligence by 2030, including by pursuing “general AI” that can act autonomously in novel circumstances. Open-source research identifies 30 Chinese institutions engaged in one or more of this project‘s aspects, including machine learning, brain-inspired AI, and brain-computer interfaces. This report previews a CSET pilot program that will track China’s progress and provide timely alerts.

Universities are the engines that power the AI talent pipeline, but mounting evidence suggests that U.S. computer science departments do not have enough faculty to meet growing student interest. This paper explores the potential mismatch between supply and demand in AI education, discusses possible causes and consequences, and offers recommendations for increasing teaching capacity at U.S. universities.

The Chinese military’s progress in artificial intelligence largely depends on continued access to high-end semiconductors. By analyzing thousands of purchasing records, this policy brief offers a detailed look at how China’s military comes to access these devices. The authors find that most computer chips ordered by Chinese military units are designed by American companies, and outline steps that the U.S. government could take to curtail their access.