In January 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) published its landmark national strategy for outer space. This document, officially titled “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,” laid out Beijing’s goals for its space sector over the following five years. These objectives spanned both industry and government, involving both civilian and military entities. 

China’s technological ambitions speak to President Xi Jinping’s mission “to explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry and build China into a space power.” The strategy set specific development and technological milestones for China’s space program within seven mission areas: 1) space launch, 2) space infrastructure, 3) manned space flight, 4) deep space exploration, 5) telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C), 6) experiments in new technologies, and 7) space environment governance. 

This blog evaluates China’s progress on its stated objectives. For each goal, we sought evidence of developments since 2022. The results are impressive. The chart below can be viewed as an interim “report card” to assess progress toward China’s 2027 goals. For each stated goal, we note if we found evidence indicating that China has achieved or made progress toward a goal, or if we found no real progress in our search. ¹

Overall, our findings suggest China is on track to fully achieve its space strategy by 2027, apart from its goals for debris mitigation. In an area as technically challenging as space, this record of success is impressive. On the launch side, it has introduced and is testing new crewed rockets, tested solid-fuel systems such as Gravity-1, and is working toward heavy-lift and reusable vehicles. Its science and exploration efforts also stand out: the Tiangong space station was finished in late 2022 and has hosted continuous six-month astronaut crews since then; in 2024, the Chang’e-6 mission became the first to return samples from the far side of the Moon; and, in 2025, the Tianwen-2 probe launched to explore an asteroid and a comet. China is also improving its Earth-monitoring satellites, its BeiDou navigation system (a rival to GPS), and its satellite internet projects. Other achievements include progress in advanced rocket engines, on-orbit servicing, and even a record-setting 100 GBPS laser communication transmission between a satellite and the ground.

Still, some key areas show that China is also struggling. The biggest gap is in space debris management. While China has tested experimental cleanup satellites such as Shijian-21, its repeated Long March-6A rocket breakups in 2022 and 2024 added hundreds of new fragments of debris into Earth’s orbit.  Other projects are moving forward but not yet complete, such as developing new propulsion systems, upcoming lunar missions, a planned Mars sample return, a future Jupiter probe, and long-term projects for interstellar exploration. China has also carried out close-approach satellite maneuvers with potential military applications, raising concerns about how these technologies might be applied and negatively affect the current space debris environment.

Observed as a whole, the picture of China’s progress is fast and wide-ranging, but with notable gaps and persistent weaknesses in addressing space debris. But the PRC’s expenditures for its space program, around $20 billion, are second only to the United States’ $80 billion. China is also working to build a thriving commercial space sector, with significant innovation and progress coming from the growing industry. Overall, China’s progress in space is expected to continue to improve rapidly.   

The results of our analysis are below. ²

Acknowledgements: For their careful review, thoughtful comments, and constructive feedback, the author would like to thank Andrew Hanna, Michael O’Connor, Emelia Probasco, and Sam Bresnick.

1. Some of the sources referenced in this work are drawn from Chinese publications. In certain niche areas such as space technologies, Chinese outlets may be the only available sources. However, these accounts can sometimes include heightened rhetoric or framing.
2.  This analysis is based on China’s own English translation of the 2021 document. There may be discrepancies within China’s English translation and the original document in Mandarin.