CSET submitted the following comment in response to a Request for Information (RFI) from the National Science Foundation (NSF) about the development of the newly established Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships (TIP) Directorate, in accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022.

U.S. policymakers are increasingly concerned about the national security implications of U.S. investments in China, and some are considering a new regime for reviewing outbound investment security. The authors identify the main U.S. investors active in the Chinese artificial intelligence market and the set of AI companies in China that have benefitted from U.S. capital. They also recommend next steps for U.S. policymakers to better address the concerns over capital flowing into the Chinese AI ecosystem.

CSET Non-Resident Senior Fellow Kevin Wolf testified before the Senate Banking Committee on U.S. export control policy and opportunities.

The U.S. semiconductor supply chain’s resilience will meaningfully increase only if current efforts to re-shore fabrication (that is, to situate more facilities that make its key parts in the United States) are met with commensurate efforts to re-shore upstream material production along with downstream assembly, test, and packaging (ATP) of finished microelectronics.

CSET Non-Resident Senior Fellow Kevin Wolf testified before the House Foreign Affairs Oversight and Accountability Subcommittee regarding U.S. export control policy and his recommendations going forward.

CSET Non-Resident Senior Fellow Kevin Wolf testified before the United Kingdom Parliament on export controls and Russia.

U.S. federal policymakers have recently gained the authority to block government agencies and private organizations from using foreign technologies that pose national security risks. But securing U.S. networks will require them to wield those powers effectively and better coordinate supply chain security efforts across all levels of government. The authors provide an overview of federal- and state-level procurement bans and recommend ways to build stronger defense against foreign technology threats.

Geopolitical tensions between the United States and China have sparked an ongoing dialogue in Washington about the phenomenon of “decoupling”—the use of public policy tools to separate the multifaceted economic ties that connect the two powers. This issue brief provides a historical lens on the efficacy of one specific aspect of this broader decoupling phenomenon: using export controls and related trade policies to prevent a rival from acquiring the equipment and know-how to catch up to the United States in cutting-edge, strategically important technologies.

As an integral player in advanced semiconductor supply chains, the United States enjoys advantages over China in producing and accessing chips for artificial intelligence and other leading-edge computing technologies. However, a lack of domestic production capacity threatens U.S. semiconductor access. The United States can strengthen its advantages by working with allies and partners to prevent China from producing leading-edge chips and by reshoring its own domestic chipmaking capacity.

The semiconductor industry and the U.S. government are engaged in ambitious plans to expand domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Previous CSET research has found that the CHIPS for America Act incentives, if carefully targeted and augmented by adequate regulatory and workforce support, could reverse the observable decline in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 1990. This paper argues that targeted investment incentives to increase U.S.-based advanced packaging capacity are also important for innovation, supply chain security, and ongoing semiconductor industry leadership.