As an integral player in advanced semiconductor supply chains, the United States enjoys advantages over China in producing and accessing chips for artificial intelligence and other leading-edge computing technologies. However, a lack of domestic production capacity threatens U.S. semiconductor access. The United States can strengthen its advantages by working with allies and partners to prevent China from producing leading-edge chips and by reshoring its own domestic chipmaking capacity.

China’s State Key Laboratory system drives the country’s innovation in science and technology. A key part of China’s aim to reduce its dependence on foreign technology, these labs conduct cutting-edge basic and applied research, attract and train domestic and foreign talent, and conduct academic exchanges with foreign counterparts. These laboratories are spread across almost all Chinese provinces except Tibet, with the majority clustered in large coastal cities.

The semiconductor industry and the U.S. government are engaged in ambitious plans to expand domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Previous CSET research has found that the CHIPS for America Act incentives, if carefully targeted and augmented by adequate regulatory and workforce support, could reverse the observable decline in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 1990. This paper argues that targeted investment incentives to increase U.S.-based advanced packaging capacity are also important for innovation, supply chain security, and ongoing semiconductor industry leadership.

Through the Quad forum, the United States, Australia, Japan and India have committed to pursuing an open, accessible and secure technology ecosystem and offering a democratic alternative to China’s techno-authoritarian model. This report assesses artificial intelligence collaboration across the Quad and finds that while Australia, Japan and India each have close AI-related research and investment ties to both the United States and China, they collaborate far less with one another.

CSET Director Dewey Murdick testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "Countering the People’s Republic of China’s Economic and Technological Plan for Dominance." Murdick discussed China's strategy to move towards self-sufficiency in key technologies and steps the United States can take to respond.

Offshoring the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment would remove an important source of leverage over China and make the United States more dependent on other countries for some of the most important inputs to semiconductor manufacturing. This brief explores the factors driving U.S. SME firms to offshore production and what can be done to slow or reverse offshoring.

CSET submitted this comment to the Department of Commerce to inform incentives, infrastructure, and research and development needed to support a strong domestic semiconductor industry.

CSET Research Analyst Dakota Cary testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on "China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States." Cary discussed the cooperative relationship between Chinese universities and China’s military and intelligence services to develop talent with the capabilities to perform state-sponsored cyberespionage operations.

CHIPS for America Act funding will result in the construction of new semiconductor fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States, employing tens of thousands of workers. This policy brief assesses the occupations and backgrounds that will be most in-demand among new fabs, as well as options for ensuring availability of the necessary talent. Findings suggest the need for new immigration pathways for experienced foreign fab workers, and investments in workforce development.

Since 1990, the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity has declined while the shares of China, South Korea, and Taiwan have increased. If carefully targeted, CHIPS for America Act incentives could reverse this trend for the types of chips that matter most to U.S. national security. In this policy brief, the author assesses how CHIPS Act incentives should be distributed across different types of chips.