In this proof-of-concept project, CSET and Amplyfi Ltd. used machine learning models and Chinese-language web data to identify Chinese companies active in artificial intelligence. Most of these companies were not labeled or described as AI-related in two high-quality commercial datasets. The authors' findings show that using structured data alone—even from the best providers—will yield an incomplete picture of the Chinese AI landscape.
Open source intelligence (OSINT) and science and technology intelligence (STI) are realized differently in the United States and China, China putting greater value on both. In the United States’ understanding, OSINT “enables” classified reporting, while in China it is the intelligence of first resort. This contrast extends to STI which has a lower priority in the U.S. system, whereas China and its top leaders personally lavish great attention on STI and rely on it for national decisions. Establishing a “National S&T Analysis Center” within the U.S. government could help to address these challenges.
The countries with the greatest capacity to develop, produce and acquire state-of-the-art semiconductor chips hold key advantages in the development of emerging technologies. At present, the United States and its allies possess significant leverage over core segments of the supply chain used to produce these chips. This policy brief outlines actions the United States and its allies can take to secure that advantage in the long term and use it to promote the beneficial use of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.
Semiconductors are a key component in fueling scientific progress, promoting economic advancement, and ensuring national security. This issue brief summarizes each component of the semiconductor supply chain and where the United States and its allies possess the greatest leverage. A related policy brief, “Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains,” recommends policy actions to ensure the United States maintains this leverage and uses it to promote the beneficial use of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.
As states turn to AI to gain an edge in cyber competition, it will change the cat-and-mouse game between cyber attackers and defenders. Embracing machine learning systems for cyber defense could drive more aggressive and destabilizing engagements between states. Wyatt Hoffman writes that cyber competition already has the ingredients needed for escalation to real-world violence, even if these ingredients have yet to come together in the right conditions.
Machine learning systems’ vulnerabilities are pervasive. Hackers and adversaries can easily exploit them. As such, managing the risks is too large a task for the technology community to handle alone. In this primer, Andrew Lohn writes that policymakers must understand the threats well enough to assess the dangers that the United States, its military and intelligence services, and its civilians face when they use machine learning.
Ben BuchananJohn BansemerDakota CaryJack LucasMicah Musser
| November 2020
Based on an in-depth analysis of artificial intelligence and machine learning systems, the authors consider the future of applying such systems to cyber attacks, and what strategies attackers are likely or less likely to use. As nuanced, complex, and overhyped as machine learning is, they argue, it remains too important to ignore.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
| November 4, 2020
CSET Founding Director Jason Matheny presented the keynote address at the virtual colloquium on the future of data science and the implications for privacy and national security hosted by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
The United States has long used export controls to prevent the proliferation of advanced semiconductors and the inputs necessary to produce them. With Beijing building up its own chipmaking industry, the United States has begun tightening restrictions on exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. This brief provides an overview of U.S. semiconductor export control policies and analyzes the impacts of those policies on U.S.-China trade.
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