CSET Research Analyst Emily Weinstein testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on "U.S. Investment in China's Capital Markets and Military-Industrial Complex." Weinstein discussed China's military-civil fusion strategy in university investment firms and Chinese talent programs.

CSET Research Fellow Saif M. Khan testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its hearing, "Advancing Effective U.S. Policy for Strategic Competition with China in the Twenty-First Century." Khan spoke to the importance of U.S. leadership in semiconductor and artificial intelligence technology.

The Chinese government is pouring money into public-private investment funds, known as guidance funds, to advance China’s strategic and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. These funds are mobilizing massive amounts of capital from public and private sources—prompting both concern and skepticism among outside observers. This overview presents essential findings from our full-length report on these funds, analyzing the guidance fund model, its intended benefits and weaknesses, and its long-term prospects for success.

China’s government is using public-private investment funds, known as guidance funds, to deploy massive amounts of capital in support of strategic and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. Drawing exclusively on Chinese-language sources, this report explores how guidance funds raise and deploy capital, manage their investment, and interact with public and private actors. The guidance fund model is no silver bullet, but it has many advantages over traditional industrial policy mechanisms.

It’s widely understood that Beijing invests significant resources in shoring up its science and technology prowess, but the extent and flows of the Chinese government’s public investments in S&T are not as well known. This project tracks publicly available information about the budgets of more than two-dozen high-level Chinese government entities, including those that support science, technology, and talent recruitment.

In this proof-of-concept project, CSET and Amplyfi Ltd. used machine learning models and Chinese-language web data to identify Chinese companies active in artificial intelligence. Most of these companies were not labeled or described as AI-related in two high-quality commercial datasets. The authors' findings show that using structured data alone—even from the best providers—will yield an incomplete picture of the Chinese AI landscape.

Open source intelligence (OSINT) and science and technology intelligence (STI) are realized differently in the United States and China, China putting greater value on both. In the United States’ understanding, OSINT “enables” classified reporting, while in China it is the intelligence of first resort. This contrast extends to STI which has a lower priority in the U.S. system, whereas China and its top leaders personally lavish great attention on STI and rely on it for national decisions. Establishing a “National S&T Analysis Center” within the U.S. government could help to address these challenges.

To help U.S. policymakers address long-held concerns about risks and threats associated with letting Chinese university students or graduates study in the United States, CSET experts examine which forms of collaboration, and with which Chinese universities, pose the greatest risk to U.S. research security.

China operates a number of party- and state-sponsored talent programs to recruit researchers -- Chinese citizens and non-citizens alike -- to bolster its strategic civilian and military goals. CSET has created a tracker to catalog publicly available information about these programs. This catalog is a work in progress; if you have further information on programs currently not included in it -- or if you spot an error -- please complete the form at http://bit.ly/ChineseTalent

See our original translation of a document that lays out the PRC government’s priorities for developing China’s civilian space infrastructure through 2025. It recommends that China reduce its reliance on foreign civilian satellite technology, but also advocates for continued use of international exchanges and technology transfer as ways to catch up to more technologically advanced countries in space infrastructure.