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Artificial intelligence that makes news headlines, such as ChatGPT, typically runs in well-maintained data centers with an abundant supply of compute and power. However, these resources are more limited on many systems in the real world, such as drones, satellites, or ground vehicles. As a result, the AI that can run onboard these devices will often be inferior to state of the art models. That can affect their usability and the need for additional safeguards in high-risk contexts. This issue brief contextualizes these challenges and provides policymakers with recommendations on how to engage with these technologies.

This data brief uses procurement records published by the U.S. Department of Defense and China’s People’s Liberation Army between April and November of 2020 to assess, and, where appropriate, compare what each military is buying when it comes to artificial intelligence. We find that the two militaries are prioritizing similar application areas, especially intelligent and autonomous vehicles and AI applications for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Foundation models could eventually introduce several pathways for undermining state security: accidents, inadvertent escalation, unintentional conflict, the proliferation of weapons, and the interference with human diplomacy are just a few on a long list. The Confidence-Building Measures for Artificial Intelligence workshop hosted by the Geopolitics Team at OpenAI and the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab at the University of California brought together a multistakeholder group to think through the tools and strategies to mitigate the potential risks introduced by foundation models to international security.

Jenny Jun's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Indo-Pacific for a hearing titled, "Illicit IT: Bankrolling Kim Jong Un."

An expert assessment of Chinese scientific literature validates China's public claim to be working toward artificial general intelligence (AGI). At a time when other nations are contemplating safeguards on AI research, China’s push toward AGI challenges emerging global norms, underscoring the need for a serious open-source monitoring program to serve as a foundation for outreach and mitigation.

The current AI-for-cybersecurity paradigm focuses on detection using automated tools, but it has largely neglected holistic autonomous cyber defense systems — ones that can act without human tasking. That is poised to change as tools are proliferating for training reinforcement learning-based AI agents to provide broader autonomous cybersecurity capabilities. The resulting agents are still rudimentary and publications are few, but the current barriers are surmountable and effective agents would be a substantial boon to society.

In late 2020, China established the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence, a state-backed institution dedicated to building software that emulates or surpasses human cognition in many or all of its aspects. Open source materials now available provide insight into BIGAI’s goals, scope, organization, methodology, and staffing. The project formalizes a trend evident in Chinese AI development toward broadly capable (general) AI.

Progress in artificial intelligence (AI) depends on talented researchers, well-designed algorithms, quality datasets, and powerful hardware. The relative importance of these factors is often debated, with many recent “notable” models requiring massive expenditures of advanced hardware. But how important is computational power for AI progress in general? This data brief explores the results of a survey of more than 400 AI researchers to evaluate the importance and distribution of computational needs.

Artificial intelligence systems are rapidly being deployed in all sectors of the economy, yet significant research has demonstrated that these systems can be vulnerable to a wide array of attacks. How different are these problems from more common cybersecurity vulnerabilities? What legal ambiguities do they create, and how can organizations ameliorate them? This report, produced in collaboration with the Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, presents the recommendations of a July 2022 workshop of experts to help answer these questions.