Since 2011, China has dramatically grown its robotics sector as part of its mission to achieve technological leadership. The Chinese government has encouraged this growth through incentives and, in some cases, subsidies. Patents in robotics have surged, particularly at Chinese universities; by contrast, private companies comprise the bulk of robotics patent filers around the world. China has also seen a corresponding growth in robotics purchasing and active robotics stock. This data brief explores the trends in robotics patent families published from China as a measure of robotics advancement and finds that China is on track to emerge as a world leader in robotics.

As dual-use technologies transform the national security landscape, the U.S. Department of Defense has established a variety of offices and programs dedicated to bringing private sector innovation into the military. However, these efforts have largely failed to drive cutting-edge commercial technology into major military platforms and systems. This report examines the shortcomings of the DOD’s current approach to defense innovation and offers recommendations for a more effective strategy.

For the first time, a Chinese company—Huawei—is set to lead the global transition from one key national security infrastructure technology to the next. How did Washington, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, fail to protect U.S. firms in this strategic technology and allow a geopolitical competitor to take a leadership position in a national security relevant critical infrastructure such as telecommunications? This policy brief highlights the characteristics of 5G development that China leveraged, exploited, and supported to take the lead in this key technology. The Huawei case study is in some ways the canary in the coal mine for emerging technologies and an illustration of what can happen to U.S. competitiveness when China’s companies do not have to base decisions on market forces.

CSET Research Analyst Will Hunt testified before the Strategic Technologies and Advanced Research (STAR) Subcommittee on "Microelectronics: Levers for Promoting Security and Innovation." He offered recommendations to advance the U.S.' semiconductor industry.

China wants to be a “cyber powerhouse” (网络强国). At the heart of this mission is the sprawling 40 km2 campus of the National Cybersecurity Center. Formally called the National Cybersecurity Talent and Innovation Base (国家网络安全人才与创新基地), the NCC is being built in Wuhan. The campus, which China began constructing in 2017 and is still building, includes seven centers for research, talent cultivation, and entrepreneurship; two government-focused laboratories; and a National Cybersecurity School.

This issue brief explores whether artificial intelligence and AI-related certifications serve as potential pathways to enter the U.S. AI workforce. The authors find that according to U.S. AI occupation job postings data over 2010–2020, there is little demand from employers for AI and AI-related certifications. From this perspective, such certifications appear to present more hype than promise.

The global map of research has shifted dramatically over the last 20 years. Annual global investment in research and development has tripled, and the United States’ share of both global R&D funding and total research output is diminishing. The open research system, with its expanding rates of investment and interconnectedness, has delivered tremendous benefits to many nations but also created new challenges for research integrity and security.

Artificial intelligence is said to be transforming the global economy and society in what some dub the “fourth industrial revolution.” This data brief analyzes media representations of AI and the alignments, or misalignments, with job postings that include the AI-related skills needed to make AI a practical reality. This potential distortion is important as the U.S. Congress places an increasing emphasis on AI. If government funds are shifted away from other areas of science and technology, based partly on the representations that leaders and the public are exposed to in the media, it is important to understand how those representations align with real jobs across the country.

A lack of good data on the U.S. artificial intelligence workforce limits the potential effectiveness of policies meant to increase and cultivate this cadre of talent. In this issue brief, the authors bridge that information gap with new analysis on the state of the U.S. AI workforce, along with insight into the ongoing concern over AI talent shortages. Their findings suggest some segments of the AI workforce are more likely than others to be experiencing a supply-demand gap.

U.S. policymakers need to understand the landscape of artificial intelligence talent and investment as AI becomes increasingly important to national and economic security. This knowledge is critical as leaders develop new alliances and work to curb China’s growing influence. As an initial effort, an earlier CSET report, “AI Hubs in the United States,” examined the domestic AI ecosystem by mapping where U.S. AI talent is produced, where it is concentrated, and where AI private equity funding goes. Given the global nature of the AI ecosystem and the importance of international talent flows, this paper looks for the centers of AI talent and investment in regions and countries that are key U.S. partners: Europe and the CANZUK countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom).