Extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography is the most important technology to have emerged out of the semiconductor industry in recent years. This report presents a case study of its development from the 1980s to the present. Using bibliometric data, this report details the evolution of the research community responsible for its development and the many scientific breakthroughs made on EUVs over a decades-long path to commercialization. The paper concludes with lessons learned for policymakers interested in protecting and promoting the next generation of emerging technologies.

Identifying emerging technologies is critical to governments, the private sector, and researchers, but these groups lack a shared analytical approach when it comes to assessing the trajectories of new technologies. To better calibrate efforts to protect and promote emerging technologies, supply chain security research provides a mature, relevant analytical framework. This report offers policymakers a template to map emerging technology supply chains using two tools developed by CSET's Emerging Technology Observatory: the Map of Science and the Supply Chain Explorer.

CSET submitted the following comment in response to a Request for Information (RFI) from the National Science Foundation (NSF) about the development of the newly established Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships (TIP) Directorate, in accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022.

The U.S. semiconductor supply chain’s resilience will meaningfully increase only if current efforts to re-shore fabrication (that is, to situate more facilities that make its key parts in the United States) are met with commensurate efforts to re-shore upstream material production along with downstream assembly, test, and packaging (ATP) of finished microelectronics.

As an integral player in advanced semiconductor supply chains, the United States enjoys advantages over China in producing and accessing chips for artificial intelligence and other leading-edge computing technologies. However, a lack of domestic production capacity threatens U.S. semiconductor access. The United States can strengthen its advantages by working with allies and partners to prevent China from producing leading-edge chips and by reshoring its own domestic chipmaking capacity.

The semiconductor industry and the U.S. government are engaged in ambitious plans to expand domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Previous CSET research has found that the CHIPS for America Act incentives, if carefully targeted and augmented by adequate regulatory and workforce support, could reverse the observable decline in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 1990. This paper argues that targeted investment incentives to increase U.S.-based advanced packaging capacity are also important for innovation, supply chain security, and ongoing semiconductor industry leadership.

Offshoring the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment would remove an important source of leverage over China and make the United States more dependent on other countries for some of the most important inputs to semiconductor manufacturing. This brief explores the factors driving U.S. SME firms to offshore production and what can be done to slow or reverse offshoring.

CSET submitted this comment to the Department of Commerce to inform incentives, infrastructure, and research and development needed to support a strong domestic semiconductor industry.

CHIPS for America Act funding will result in the construction of new semiconductor fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States, employing tens of thousands of workers. This policy brief assesses the occupations and backgrounds that will be most in-demand among new fabs, as well as options for ensuring availability of the necessary talent. Findings suggest the need for new immigration pathways for experienced foreign fab workers, and investments in workforce development.

Since 1990, the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity has declined while the shares of China, South Korea, and Taiwan have increased. If carefully targeted, CHIPS for America Act incentives could reverse this trend for the types of chips that matter most to U.S. national security. In this policy brief, the author assesses how CHIPS Act incentives should be distributed across different types of chips.