Identifying emerging technologies is critical to governments, the private sector, and researchers, but these groups lack a shared analytical approach when it comes to assessing the trajectories of new technologies. To better calibrate efforts to protect and promote emerging technologies, supply chain security research provides a mature, relevant analytical framework. This report offers policymakers a template to map emerging technology supply chains using two tools developed by CSET's Emerging Technology Observatory: the Map of Science and the Supply Chain Explorer.

CSET submitted the following comment in response to a Request for Information (RFI) from the National Science Foundation (NSF) about the development of the newly established Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships (TIP) Directorate, in accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022.

Israel has by far the largest AI ecosystem in the Middle East as measured in AI companies and financial investments, and foreign investors play a critical role in Israel’s AI market growth. This issue brief finds that AI investments in Israel have mostly originated from the United States. To date, Chinese investors have played a limited role in funding Israel’s dynamic AI companies. But understanding the risk of Chinese investments into the Israeli AI ecosystem will be important for the national security of both the United States and Israel.

China’s government has pushed the country’s technology and financial firms to expand abroad, and Southeast Asia’s growing economies — and AI companies — offer promising opportunities. This report examines the scope and nature of Chinese investment in the region. It finds that China currently plays a limited role in Southeast Asia’s emerging AI markets outside of Singapore and that Chinese investment activity still trails behind that of the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese tech companies, with support from the Chinese government, have established a broad range of other AI-related linkages with public and commercial actors across Southeast Asia.

The U.S. semiconductor supply chain’s resilience will meaningfully increase only if current efforts to re-shore fabrication (that is, to situate more facilities that make its key parts in the United States) are met with commensurate efforts to re-shore upstream material production along with downstream assembly, test, and packaging (ATP) of finished microelectronics.

CSET's Catherine Aiken testified before the National Artificial Intelligence Advisory Committee on measuring progress in U.S. AI research and development.

As an integral player in advanced semiconductor supply chains, the United States enjoys advantages over China in producing and accessing chips for artificial intelligence and other leading-edge computing technologies. However, a lack of domestic production capacity threatens U.S. semiconductor access. The United States can strengthen its advantages by working with allies and partners to prevent China from producing leading-edge chips and by reshoring its own domestic chipmaking capacity.

The semiconductor industry and the U.S. government are engaged in ambitious plans to expand domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity. Previous CSET research has found that the CHIPS for America Act incentives, if carefully targeted and augmented by adequate regulatory and workforce support, could reverse the observable decline in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 1990. This paper argues that targeted investment incentives to increase U.S.-based advanced packaging capacity are also important for innovation, supply chain security, and ongoing semiconductor industry leadership.

Through the Quad forum, the United States, Australia, Japan and India have committed to pursuing an open, accessible and secure technology ecosystem and offering a democratic alternative to China’s techno-authoritarian model. This report assesses artificial intelligence collaboration across the Quad and finds that while Australia, Japan and India each have close AI-related research and investment ties to both the United States and China, they collaborate far less with one another.

Offshoring the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment would remove an important source of leverage over China and make the United States more dependent on other countries for some of the most important inputs to semiconductor manufacturing. This brief explores the factors driving U.S. SME firms to offshore production and what can be done to slow or reverse offshoring.