China is embracing “embodied AI”—artificial intelligence integrated with physical agents, such as robots and drones—both for commercial reasons and as a path to artificial general intelligence (AGI). The trend reflects China’s signature approach to AI, which recognizes diverse paths to AI dominance vis-à-vis the large models favored in the United States. This report documents PRC support for AI embodiment, describes how it is understood by China’s research community, and maps out the related infrastructure.

CSET Lead Analyst Dr. William Hannas testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet for its hearing, "Intellectual Property and Strategic Competition with China: Part 3 - IP Theft, Cybersecurity, and AI."

In response to the Office of Science and Technology Policy's request for input on an AI Action Plan, CSET provides key recommendations for advancing AI research, ensuring U.S. competitiveness, and maximizing benefits while mitigating risks. Our response highlights policies to strengthen the AI workforce, secure technology from illicit transfers, and foster an open and competitive AI ecosystem.

Large generative models are widely viewed as the most promising path to general (human-level) artificial intelligence and attract investment in the billions of dollars. The present enthusiasm notwithstanding, a chorus of ranking Chinese scientists regard this singular approach to AGI as ill-advised. This report documents these critiques in China’s research, public statements, and government planning, while pointing to additional, pragmatic reasons for China’s pursuit of a diversified research portfolio.

China’s leadership believes that artificial intelligence will play a central role in future wars. However, the author's comprehensive review of dozens of Chinese-language journal articles about AI and warfare reveals that Chinese defense experts claim that Beijing is facing several technological challenges that may hinder its ability to capitalize on the advantages provided by military AI. This report outlines these perceived barriers and identifies several technologies that Chinese experts believe may help the country develop and deploy military AI-enabled systems.

The celebrated return to China of its overseas scientists, as evidenced in the recent case of physicist Gao Huajian, is typically cited as a loss to the United States. This report argues a contrarian view that the benefits equation is far more complicated. PRC programs that channel diaspora achievements “back” to China and the inclination of many scientists to work in familiar venues blur the distinction between returning to China and staying in place.

China’s brain-computer interface research has two dimensions. Besides its usual applications in neuropathology, China is extending the benefits of BCI to the general population, aiming at enhanced cognition and a “merger” of natural and artificial intelligence. This report, authored in collaboration with researchers from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London uses bibliometric analysis and expert assessment of technical documents to evaluate China’s BCI, and conclude that the research is on track to achieve its targets.

Demand for talent is one of the core elements of technological competition between the United States and China. In this issue brief, we explore demand signals in China’s domestic AI workforce in two ways: geographically and within the defense and surveillance sectors. Our exploration of job postings from Spring 2021 finds that more than three-quarters of all AI job postings are concentrated in just three regions: the Yangtze River Delta region, the Pearl River Delta, and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area.

This report summarizes more than 20 CSET reports, translations, and data analyses to provide insight into the steps China has taken to increase its technological competitiveness beyond its own borders.