The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. William C. Hannas – professor at Georgetown University, lead analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), and co-editor with Huey-Meei Chang of “Chinese Power and Artificial Intelligence: Perspectives and Challenges” (Routledge 2023) – is the 421st in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Examine the correlation between Chinese power and artificial intelligence.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of a short list of technologies marked for priority support in China and, by some accounts, ranks at the very top. The attention the PRC government pays to AI development is reflected in state-level plans that began in 2015; by the position AI holds in China’s 14th Five-year Plan (2021-2025), where it ranks first among “frontier industries;” and by China’s unabashed goal to be the world’s leader in AI by 2030.
This aspiration is credible. Behind China’s declarations of intent are the volume and quality of Chinese AI research evidenced in peer-reviewed journals, the scale of state- and private-sector investment, the infusion of AI at all levels of education, support from its diaspora population, China’s unmatched ability to field applications, and its willingness to explore alternate paths to advanced AI beyond the large language models (LLM) that typify most global initiatives.
The link between AI and a country’s economic and military power is understood clearly in China. Our greatest concern – and we have many – is the likelihood China’s ruling elite will harness AI to perpetuate itself under the guise of “safety” and alignment with socialist values.
Identify China’s diverse range of targets and programs for acquiring foreign AI proprietary information and talent.
The PRC’s history of looking abroad for inspiration in science and technology (S&T) has been documented in detail, is acknowledged by the principals, and needs no elaboration. Essentially, we took our understanding of China’s transfer practices and looked for AI examples.
Every transfer venue identified earlier, without exception, we found to be used to support China’s AI development. The science ministry’s foreign transfer offices are all doing some form of AI “outreach.” The State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs, Ministry of Education, and technical ministries have ramped up engagement. All major “talent” programs are recruiting AI specialists. Most China-oriented overseas professional associations have signaled support. Their counterparts in China – the tech “transfer centers” – have adjusted their priorities.
Access to global AI expertise is facilitated by U.S. tech firms, many of which have facilities in China, and by foreign academics individually and through their institutions. Examples are international AI alliances, school-to-school partnerships, co-authored research and, of course, students abroad. That said, one should not disparage China’s indigenous AI research. The two approaches complement each other.
Read the full article at The Diplomat.